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Abstract 
Past work has demonstrated that people’s moral judgments can influence their judgments in 
a number of domains that might seem to involve straightforward matters of fact, including 
judgments about freedom, causation, the doing/allowing distinction, and intentional action. The 
present studies explore whether the effect of morality in these four domains can be explained by 
changes in the relevance of alternative possibilities. More precisely, we propose that moral judgment 
influences the degree to which people regard certain alternative possibilities as relevant, which in 
turn impacts intuitions about freedom, causation, doing/allowing, and intentional action. Employing 
the stimuli used in previous research, Studies 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a show that the relevance of 
alternatives is influenced by moral judgments and mediates the impact of morality on non-moral 
judgments. Studies 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b then provide direct empirical evidence for the link between 
the relevance of alternatives and judgments in these four domains by manipulating (rather than 
measuring) the relevance of alternative possibilities. Lastly, Study 5 demonstrates that the critical 
mechanism is not whether alternative possibilities are considered, but whether they are regarded as 
relevant.  These studies support a unified framework for understanding the impact of morality across 
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Unifying morality’s influence on non-moral judgments: The relevance of alternative possibilities  
 
A series of recent studies have shown that people’s moral judgments can impact their 
intuitions about issues that might appear to be straightforward matters of fact. This effect was noted 
early on for intuitions about whether an agent acted intentionally (Knobe, 2003), but it soon became 
clear that a very similar pattern could be found in numerous other domains. Among other things, 
people’s moral judgments also influence their intuitions about whether an agent acted freely, whether 
an action caused some further outcome, and whether an agent did something or merely allowed it to 
happen (Cushman, Knobe & Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Phillips & 
Knobe 2009; Young & Phillips, 2011). 
One way to explain these phenomena would be to offer an independent account for each of 
the separate effects. So one could construct a hypothesis about why moral considerations influence 
intuitions about intentional action (Guglielmo & Malle, 2010; Machery, 2008; Nichols & Ulatowski, 
2007; Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010), then another separate hypothesis about why moral considerations 
impact intuitions about causation (Menzies, 2010; Sytsma, Livengood, & Rose, 2012), and so on. 
(Some have even argued explicitly that there cannot be a unified explanation of all of these effects; 
Hindriks, 2014.) 
Here, we pursue the exact opposite approach. Rather than looking separately at each 
individual effect, we want to consider the widespread influence of moral cognition in these different 
domains, and to offer a unified explanation that applies to them all. Specifically, we will suggest that 
all these effects can be explained in terms of a very general principle involving the relationship 
between people’s moral judgments and their way of understanding alternative possibilities. 
The Role of Possibilities 
           Research in a number of different fields has independently argued for the importance of 
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alternative possibilities, including work in philosophy (e.g., Bennett, 2003; Lewis, 1973), linguistics 
(Kratzer, 2012; for a review, see Portner, 2009), psychology (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Byrne, 2005, 
for a review see, Roese, 1997), and computer science (e.g., Bello, in press; Halpern & Pearl, 2005; 
Pearl, 2000). In each of these cases, the central insight has been that our understanding of the things 
that occur is shaped in some fundamental way by our understanding of alternative possibilities that 
could have occurred but actually did not. 
         Intriguingly, existing theoretical work has already suggested that alternative possibilities play 
a role in each of the domains in which we find these surprising effects of moral judgment. As one 
example, consider judgments about freedom. Within existing theoretical work, it is widely 
acknowledged that the question as to whether someone acted freely depends, in part, on whether it 
would have been possible for that person to have done something else instead (Aquinas, 1273/1920; 
Berlin, 1969/2002; Aristotle, 350 BC/2002). Thus, on one view, claims about freedom like (1a) 
depend on claims about alternative possibilities like (1b). 
(1) a. She did x freely. 
      b. If she had wanted not to do x, she would not have done x. 
Similarly, within existing work on judgments about causation, it is widely believed that causal 
judgments in some way rely on representations of alternative possibilities (Lewis, 1973; Pearl, 2000). 
In particular, a number of accounts of causation suggest that causal claims like (2a) depend at least 
partially on claims about alternative possibilities like (2b). 
(2) a. Event x caused event y. 
      b. If x had not happened, y would not have happened. 
Within existing work in this tradition, there is a great deal of controversy about precisely how to 
spell out the relationship between alternative possibilities and judgments about freedom, causation, 
etc. (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014; Nduibuisi & Byrne, 2013; Woodward, 2004). However, the details 
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of this controversy will not concern us here. The key point is simply that judgments in each of these 
domains depend in some way on how we understand the alternative possibilities that could have 
happened, but didn’t. 
        Across a number of fields, existing work on alternative possibilities has also introduced a 
further idea that plays a central role in the present hypothesis: People do not treat all alternative 
possibilities equally. Instead, they regard certain possibilities as relevant, while treating others as 
completely irrelevant (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014; Lewis, 1973; Portner, 2009; Roese, 1997). To the 
extent that they regard an alternative possibility as irrelevant, they will tend to ignore it entirely, and 
it will play little role in their judgments in any domain. 
To give one simple example, suppose that a group of people is giving a presentation, and 
they end up doing a terrible job. As we consider what actually occurred in this case, we might regard 
certain alternative possibilities as especially relevant. For example, possibilities in which they had 
spent more time preparing might seem especially relevant. Or perhaps even possibilities in which 
they had simply decided not to give the presentation at all. But then there are numerous other 
possibilities that we would regard as completely irrelevant. Thus, we would never regard as relevant 
the possibility that the presentation could have been interrupted by a freak tornado, or the possibility 
that the earth’s gravitational field could have suddenly ceased to exist. People might be capable of 
entertaining possibilities like these if forced to, but all the same, they would regard them utterly 
pointless, not even worthy of the slightest consideration. 
Most importantly for present purposes, the distinction between relevant and irrelevant 
possibilities has been invoked to explain judgments in the specific domains under consideration 
here. Take the example of causation. As we noted above, it seems that people only regard a factor as 
causal if, when considering alternative possibilities in which that factor does not occur, the outcome 
also does not occur (Lewis, 1973; Pearl, 2000). But theoretical work suggests that it is not enough 
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for this to be true; possibilities in which this factor does not occur must also be relevant. In cases 
where such possibilities are regarded as irrelevant, people will simply reject the corresponding causal 
claim (e.g., Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014; Schaffer & Blanchard, in press). To illustrate this point, 
consider the causal claim (3a) and the corresponding claim about an alternative possibility (3b). 
(3) a. The earth’s gravitational field caused that disastrous presentation. 
b. If the earth’s gravitational field had not been present, the disastrous presentation 
would not have occurred. 
The claim (3b) is surely true. Yet at the same time, possibilities in which the earth’s gravitational field 
is not present seem entirely irrelevant, and thus the theory predicts that the corresponding causal 
claim should also be seen as absurd.  
As this example helps to make clear, it is critical to distinguish between the degree to which 
people actively consider an alternative possibility and the degree to which they regard that alternative 
possibility as relevant. Previous work in social psychology has explored the impact of counterfactual 
reasoning, and this work has demonstrated that actively considering a particular possibility can have 
an important impact on many aspects of human behavior (for reviews, see Byrne, 2005; Epstude & 
Roese, 2008; Roese, 1997). The focus of the present paper, however is on a somewhat different 
phenomenon. Independent of the question of whether or not people consider a particular 
possibility, there seems to be a question as to whether people regard that possibility as relevant. 
(Even if people are specifically instructed to reason about the possibility that the earth’s gravitational 
field could suddenly disappear, they might continue to regard this possibility as completely 
irrelevant.)  As far as we know, this approach has not yet been directly tested in experimental work, 
but it has been developed in considerable technical detail within the existing theoretical literature in 
several different fields (e.g., Bello, in press; Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014; Knobe, 2010; Kratzer, 
2012; Schaffer & Blanchard, in press).   
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 If we are seeking a unified way of explaining why people’s moral judgments influence their 
judgments in the domains of freedom, cause, etc., then the relevance of alternative possibilities may 
help. That is, if we can show that people’s moral judgments influence their judgments of the 
relevance of alternative possibilities, then we may be able to provide a unified account of morality’s 
influence in all four of these areas. We propose to test this basic model (Fig. 1) in the current paper. 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed model with the relevance of alternative possibilities mediating the influence of 
morality in the domains of freedom, causation, doing vs. allowing, and intentional action.  
Morality and the Relevance of Alternative Possibilities 
Thus far, we have been considering the evidence that judgments of the relevance of 
alternative possibilities influence intuitions in each of the four domains. We now turn to the other 
link in our model – the claim that moral judgments influence judgments about the relevance of 
alternative possibilities. Specifically, there is a general tendency to regard alternative possibilities as 
more relevant to the extent that they involve replacing something morally bad (in the actual world) 
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with something morally good (in the alternative possibilities).  Some form of this basic idea can be 
found across a wide variety of different theoretical accounts that have been spelled out within quite 
different theoretical frameworks (e.g., Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014; Knobe & Szabo, 2013; Schaffer 
& Blanchard, in press). The precise technical implementation varies considerably from one 
framework to the next, but the core idea that is shared across all of these accounts is a highly 
intuitive one. 
Suppose you believe that a certain aspect of the way people typically treat each other is 
fundamentally morally wrong. You might then see it as highly relevant to consider alternative 
possibilities in which people treated each other in the way you believed to be morally good. If you 
saw a man insulting a homeless person, for example, the alternative that he could have instead tried 
to help the homeless person clearly seems relevant. Now, by contrast, suppose you believe that a 
certain aspect of the way people typically treat each other is morally good. In that latter case, you 
might regard it as completely irrelevant to consider alternative possibilities in which, for some 
reason, people treated each other in the way you believe to be morally bad. It clearly does not seem 
relevant to think about how the man could have insulted the homeless man instead of helping him. 
The Present Studies 
Past work offers theoretical support for the idea that the influence of morality may occur by 
altering people’s intuitions about the relevance of possibilities. Yet to date, there has been little 
empirical work that directly investigates this relationship. This is our aim in the present studies. 
More precisely, we propose that morality influences the degree to which people judge certain 
alternative possibilities as relevant, which in turn impacts people’s intuitions in non-moral domains. 
 To test this model, we took the materials from four previously published studies that 
originally demonstrated morality’s influence in the domains of freedom, causation, doing/allowing, 
and intentional action. The use of these previous materials naturally limits researcher degrees of 
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freedom and experimenter bias (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; Strickland & Suben, 2012). 
Further constraining researcher degrees of freedom, we also explored each domain using exactly the 
same methods. Specifically, within each domain, we conducted two studies: one that checked for 
mediation by relevance of alternatives and one that manipulated relevance of alternatives.  
 For each of the mediation studies, we replicated an existing experiment and then added a 
further measure in which participants were directly asked about the relevance of certain alternatives. 
We predicted that the different conditions of the original experiment would lead to different 
judgments on the measure of relevance of alternatives, which would in turn mediate the impact of 
condition on the original dependent variable.  
For the manipulation studies, we took the morally neutral condition of each of the original 
experiments and then tried to manipulate the relevance of alternatives using an entirely non-moral 
method. If morality affects judgments of freedom, causation, doing/allowing, and intentional action 
by changing the relevance of alternative possibilities, then morality should not be special in its 
influence on these domains. In fact, any factor that influences the relevance of alternative 
possibilities should also impact judgments in these various domains. Accordingly, to manipulate the 
extent to which participants regarded alternatives to the agents’ actions as relevant, participants were 
instructed to write a brief paragraph about what else the agent could have done. (Participants in a 
control condition were simply asked to summarize the story). Admittedly, the effect of this novel 
way of manipulating the relevance of alternative possibilities may not be as strong as the original 
effects of morality observed in the previous studies. Still, as this manipulation parallels the proposed 
mechanism, we expect that participants who are asked to engage in writing about alternative 
possibilities (vs. summarize the story) will show a pattern of judgments similar to those observed in 
the morally bad (vs. morally neutral) actions. 
These experimental methods are applied to judgments of freedom (Study 1a-b), causation 
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(Study 2a-b), doing vs. allowing (Study 3a-b), and intentional action (Study 4a-b). In each case, we 
find two pieces of support for the proposed model. First, we find that judgments of the relevance of 
alternative possibilities mediate the effect of morality on judgments in these four domains. However, 
the evidence from these mediation analyses is equivocal because the data fit alternative mediation 
models. Second, and more conclusively, we provide direct evidence of the role of alternative 
possibilities by non-morally manipulating the relevance of alternatives and then demonstrating that 
all four kinds of judgments are affected by this manipulation in precisely the same way that they 
were affected by morality. Having considered relevant alternatives to the agent’s action, participants 
judge that the actor was less forced, more of a cause, did something rather than merely allowed it to 
happen, and acted more intentionally. Study 5 then provides a demonstration that it is the perceived 
relevance of alternatives (rather than simply the process of considering of alternative possibilities) that 
affects participants’ judgments. Taken together, these five studies provide support for a unifying 
framework in which the impact of morality on a wide array of disparate judgments can be accounted 
for by morality’s influence on the relevance of alternative possibilities. 
 
Study 1: Freedom and Force 
Past research has found that morality impacts judgments about whether an agent performed 
an action freely or was simply forced to perform that action (Phillips & Knobe, 2009; Young & 
Phillips, 2011). In one study, participants were asked to read a scenario in which a ship captain saved 
his ship from sinking either by doing something morally bad (throwing his wife overboard) or by 
doing something morally neutral (throwing his wife’s cargo overboard). Participants were less likely 
to judge that the ship captain was forced to throw something overboard when doing so was morally 
bad than when it was not.  
In theoretical accounts of freedom (Aquinas, 1273/1920; Berlin, 1969/2002; Aristotle, 350 
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BC/2002), whether or not an agent is rightly said to have acted freely depends critically on what other 
actions the agent could have done instead. It has proven remarkably difficult to say precisely how it 
is that the concept of freedom relates to these other possible actions, and which other possibilities 
bear on the question as to whether the agent acted freely (see, e.g., Cova, 2014; Cova & Kitano, 
2014; Miller & Feltz, 2011; Woolfolk, Doris & Darley, 2006). However, what we rely on here is 
simply the idea that alternative possibilities play some essential role in people’s judgments about 
freedom. 
Thus, one possible way to explain the impact of moral judgments on judgments of freedom 
is to argue that participants’ moral judgments influenced the extent to which they found it relevant 
to consider the alternative actions that the agent could have done instead. We test this possibility 
using both a mediational analysis (Study 1a) and a direct manipulation of the relevance of alternative 
possibilities (Study 1b).  
Study 1a Mediation 
If people’s moral judgments are changing which alternative possibilities they consider to be 
relevant when reading the vignette, we predict that participants will judge that it is more relevant to 
consider the possibility that the ship captain could have not thrown his wife (vs. his wife’s cargo) 
overboard. Moreover, we predict that the previously observed impact of morality on judgments of 
freedom will be mediated by these judgments of relevance. 
Method  
Participants. Four hundred participants (148 female, 1 unreported, mean age = 32.65, 
SD=10.07) were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in exchange for a small monetary 
payment. 
Procedure.  All participants read the vignette about the ship captain (Phillips & Knobe, 
2009). Those in the morally neutral condition read about the captain throwing his wife’s cargo 
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overboard, whereas those in the morally bad condition read about the captain throwing his wife 
overboard: 
  
“While sailing on the sea, a large storm came upon a captain and his ship. As the waves 
began to grow larger, the captain realized that his small vessel was too heavy and the 
ship would flood if he didn’t make it lighter. 
  
The only way that the captain could keep the ship from capsizing was to throw his 
wife [his wife’s expensive cargo] overboard. Thinking quickly, the captain took her 
[her cargo] and tossed it into the sea. While the captain’s wife [the expensive cargo] 
sank to the bottom of the sea, the captain was able to survive the storm and returned 
home safely.” 
 
Secondly, participants completed the relevance of alternatives measure. Because participants are 
most likely unfamiliar with being asked to report on the relevance of alternative possibilities, we 
designed a measure that presented this basic concept in an easily understandable conversational 
context. Participants were asked to imagine that two people, Sam and Alex, had the following 
discussion concerning the scenario: 
Alex: "I wonder how things could have gone differently." 
Sam: "Well, the captain could have decided not to throw the cargo [his wife] overboard." 
Alex: "Really? Of all the ways things could have gone differently, that doesn't seem like the 
one that's relevant to consider." 
  
Notice that Alex’s final statement is a claim that the possibility raised by Sam is an irrelevant one. 
Accordingly, participants were simply asked to rate how much they agreed with Alex, on a scale 
from 1 (“completely disagree”) to 7 (“completely agree”). This agreement rating was then reverse 
coded to give us a direct measure of the relevance (rather than irrelevance) of this alternative 
possibility.  
After completing this measure, participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed 
with the statement “The ship captain was forced to throw his wife’s expensive cargo [his wife] 
overboard.” on a scale from 1 (“disagree”) to 7 (“agree”). Lastly, demographic information was 
THE RELEVANCE OF ALTERNATIVES                                                                            13 
assessed. All stimuli, data, and analyses are available at: https://github.com/phillipsjs/RoA 
Results 
First, we tested whether morality had an influence on judgments of force. Replicating 
previous results, we found that participants more agreed that captain was forced in the morally 
neutral condition (M=5.56, SD=1.50) than in the morally bad condition (M=2.54, SD=1.52), 
t(398)= -20.00, p < .001, d = 2.00. 
Next, we investigated whether morality influenced how relevant participants found the 
proposed alternative possibility (the hypothesized mediating variable). As predicted, people were 
more likely to judge that it was relevant to consider the possibility that the captain could have not 
thrown his wife overboard (M=5.72, SD=1.68) than they were to judge that it was relevant to 
consider the possibility that he could have not thrown his wife’s cargo overboard (M=3.43, 
SD=1.97), t(388.48)=12.529, p<.001, d=1.253. 
We then used a bootstrap mediational analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) to test whether 
judgments of the relevance of alternatives mediates the effect of morality on judgments of force 
(Fig. 2).  Using 5,000 resamples, we found that there was a significant indirect effect of morality 
condition on judgments of force through judgments of relevance (95% CIs [0.40, 0.89]). 
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Figure 2. Mediation model with judgments of the relevance of alternative possibilities mediating the 
effect of morality on judgments of force. Unstandarized coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are shown for each path. Asterisks indicate significance, ***p<.001. 
We additionally tested the ‘reverse’ mediation model (with force mediating the impact of 
condition on relevance) and found that it was also supported by the data, 95% CIs [-1.62, -0.83]. 
There are at least two possible explanations for the statistical support we find for this alternative 
model. The first is that the moral valence of the agent’s action could have somehow more directly 
changed participant’s judgments of freedom, and then participants’ judgments of the relevance of 
alternative possibilities were affected by this shift in whether the agent was regarded as having acted 
freely. A second, simpler possibility is that our novel measure of relevance was simply insensitive or 
noisy. If true, it would be unsurprising that judgments of freedom mediated the effect of morality on 
the relevance of alternatives, since judgments of freedom themselves have long been understood to 
be highly sensitive to changes in relevance of alternative possibilities.  
Study 1b. Manipulation 
To provide a more conclusive test of the role of the relevance of alternative possibilities, we 
turn to a direct manipulation of this proposed mediator and ask whether this has the same effect as 
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morality on judgments of freedom. Specifically, we test whether non-morally increasing the 
relevance of alternative actions the agent could have taken leads participants to judge he acted more 
freely.  
Method 
Participants. One hundred and six participants (53 women, mean age=34.14, SD=12.14) 
completed a questionnaire using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Procedure. All participants received the neutral case from Study 1a, in which the captain 
throws his wife’s cargo overboard. Participants were assigned either to a control condition or a 
‘relevant alternatives’ condition. Participants in the control condition were simply asked to 
summarize and describe the events that actually happened in the vignette. Those in the relevant 
alternatives condition were asked to think about what other decisions the ship captain could have 
made.   
Participants were then asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the claim that the captain 
was forced to throw the cargo overboard. Participants rated their agreement with this statement on a 
scale from 1 (‘completely disagree’) to 7 (‘completely agree’). 
Results 
Mirroring the effect of morality in Study 1a, participants in the relevant alternatives 
condition rated the ship captain as significantly less forced (M=5.46, SD=1.50) than those in the 
control condition (M=6.17, SD=1.59), t(104)=2.36, p=.02, d=.46.  
Study 1a-b Discussion 
Employing the stimuli used in previous research, we first tested whether the moral valence 
of an action influences people’s judgments of the relevance of alternative possibilities. As 
hypothesized, when an action was morally bad (vs. morally neutral), people were more likely to judge 
as relevant the alternative possibilities in which the agent does not do that action, and these 
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judgments of relevance also mediated the effect of morality on judgments of freedom. The 
mediation we observed was only partial, which could have resulted either from (1) the relevance of 
alternative possibilities accounting for a relatively small portion of the effect or (2) a relatively weak 
relationship between participants’ actual representation of alternative possibilities and the particular 
measure we employed. However, Study 1b provided further support for the hypothesized role of the 
relevance of alternatives possibilities in the judgments of freedom. After participants generated 
alternatives to the agent’s action (e.g., “He could’ve thrown his own stuff overboard.”), they judged 
that the actor was less forced to do the action he did, precisely mirroring the pattern observed when 
morality was manipulated. 
 
Study 2: Causation 
  As in the work on freedom and force, previous research on causal cognition has found that 
the moral status of an action also influences the extent to which people judge that action to be a 
cause of some outcome (Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Alicke, 2000). For example, in one study, 
participants were asked to read a vignette about a philosophy department in which administrative 
assistants were allowed to take pens, but professors were not. One day, an administrative assistant 
took one of the two last pens (a morally neutral action), and so did a professor (a morally bad 
action). A problem then arose because there were no more pens. When asked who caused the 
problem, participants overwhelmingly agreed that the professor was the cause of the problem 
(Knobe & Fraser, 2008). 
 As with freedom, prior theoretical work in the domain of causal cognition has proposed that 
causal judgments depend in some fundamental way on alternative possibilities (Lewis, 1979; Pearl, 
2000). Within the research on this relationship, there are different views on the topic, with some 
saying that causal cognition should be understood in terms of alternative possibilities (e.g., 
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Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado & Tenenbaum, 2015; Wells & Gavanski, 1989), others 
emphasizing that alternative possibilities themselves are insufficient and arguing for a role for 
mechanism information (Copley & Wolff, 2014; Walsh & Sloman, 2011), and still others proposing 
pluralistic views that involve both alternative possibilities and mechanism information (Lombrozo, 
2010). As in the case of freedom, the central idea we rely on here is simply that alternative 
possibilities play some role in causal cognition.  
Drawing on these accounts, it may be that part of the reason people’s moral judgments 
impact their causal judgments is that people’s moral judgments impact the degree to which they 
regard certain alternatives as relevant, which in turn impacts their causal cognition. Here we directly 
test this prediction. 
Study 2a: Mediation 
Method 
Participants. Four hundred participants (154 women, mean age = 29.10, SD=8.84) were 
recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in exchange for payment. One participant did not complete 
the survey and was excluded from the analyses. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to read one of two variants of the scenario about the 
professor and the pens (Knobe & Fraser, 2008). The original study used a within-subjects design 
that does not allow for mediational analyses. Here, we instead employ a between-subjects 
manipulation of the morality of Professor Smith’s action that allows us to test the hypothesized 
mediation as in Study 1.1 Accordingly, Professor Smith’s action was described as morally wrong in 
one condition: 
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked with pens. The 
administrative assistants are allowed to take pens, but faculty members are supposed 
to buy their own. The administrative assistants typically do take the pens. 
Unfortunately, so do the faculty members. The receptionist has repeatedly e-mailed 
them reminders that only administrators are allowed to take the pens. 
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and was described as morally neutral in the other condition: 
  
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked with pens. Both 
the administrative assistants and the faculty members are allowed to take the pens, and 
both the administrative assistants and the faculty members typically do take the pens. 
The receptionist has repeatedly e-mailed them reminders that both administrators and 
professors are allowed to take the pens. 
 
In both conditions, participants were told that the professor and the administrative assistant 
took pens: 
 
On Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants encounters Professor Smith 
walking past the receptionist‘s desk. Both take pens. Later, that day, the receptionist 
needs to take an important message... but she has a problem. There are no pens left 
on her desk. 
 
Then, as in Study 1, participants read about two people (Sam and Alex) discussing how 
things could have gone differently. Sam raises the possibility that Professor Smith could have not 
taken the pen, and Alex responds that this possibility is not one that is relevant to consider. 
Participants were then asked to rate how much they agreed with Alex, on a scale from 1 
(“completely disagree”) to 7 (“completely agree”). In addition, participants were asked how much 
they agreed with the statement “Professor Smith caused the problem” on a scale from 1 (“strongly 
disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Lastly, demographic information was assessed.  
Results 
         In line with the previous results, we found that participants rated Professor Smith as more of 
a cause of the problem when he acted immorally (M=4.82, SD=1.63) than when his action was 
morally neutral (M=2.39, SD=1.48), t(397)=15.58, p<.001, d=1.56. Next, we investigated whether 
participants judged the possibility that Professor Smith could have not taken a pen to be more 
relevant when he acted immorally. We again reverse-coded these judgments, so that they indicated 
how relevant (rather than irrelevant) participant regarded this alternative possibility to be. As 
predicted, participants regarded the possibility in which the professor did not take a pen to be more 
relevant when this action was immoral (M=5.08, SD=1.79) than when this action was morally 
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neutral (M=3.42, SD=1.84), t(397)=9.14, p<.001, d=.915.  
We then used a bootstrap mediational analysis to test whether judgments of the relevance of 
alternatives mediates the effect of morality on judgments of causation (Fig. 3).  Using 5,000 
resamples, we found that there was a significant indirect effect of morality condition on judgments 
of force through judgments of relevance (95% CIs [-0.88,-0.44]). 
 
 
Figure 3. Mediation model with judgments of the relevance of alternative possibilities mediating the 
effect of morality on judgments of causation. Unstandarized coefficients and standard errors (in 
parentheses) are shown for each path. Asterisks indicate significance, ***p<.001. 
We also tested the ‘reverse’ mediation model (with causation mediating the impact of 
condition on relevance) and again found that it was also supported by the data 95% CIs [-1.61, -
0.95]. As with judgments of force, the same two explanations may account for the support we find 
for this alternative mediation model. Accordingly, we now turn to a direct manipulation of the 
proposed mediator.  
Study 2b: Manipulation 
Similar to the case of freedom, we test whether non-morally manipulating the relevance of 
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alternative possibilities impacts participants’ judgments in the same way that morality does. More 
specifically, we ask whether non-morally increasing the relevance of alternative actions the agent 
could have taken leads participants to see the agent as more of a cause of the outcome. 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred thirty-four participants (109 women, mean age = 30.98, 
SD=9.24) completed a questionnaire using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Procedure. All participants received the morally neutral vignette from Study 2a in which the 
professor is allowed to take the pens. Participants were assigned either to a control condition, in 
which they were simply asked to summarize and describe the events that actually happened in the 
vignette, or a ‘relevant alternatives’ condition, in which they were asked to think about what other 
decisions the professor could have made, other than deciding to take a pen. 
Participants were then asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the claim that the 
professor caused the problem. Participants rated their agreement with this statement on a scale from 
1 (‘completely disagree’) to 7 (‘completely agree’). 
Results 
Mirroring the effect of morality in Study 2a, participants in the relevant alternatives 
condition rated the professor as more of a cause (M=3.04, SD=1.80) than those in the control 
condition (M=2.34, SD=1.45), t(322.00)=3.31, p=.001, d=0.42, corrected for unequal variance. 
Study 2a-b Discussion 
As in the domain of freedom, we again found that moral valence of an action influences 
people’s judgments about the relevance of alternative possibilities. Additionally, these judgments 
mediated the effect of morality on participants’ causal judgments. Study 2b then provided further 
evidence of the role of the relevance of alternatives possibilities: when participants were asked to 
consider alternatives to the agent’s action, they judged the actor to be more of a cause of the 
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outcome that occurred, mirroring the pattern observed when morality was manipulated in Study 2a. 
 
Study 3: Doing/Allowing 
 In Study 3, we take up judgments of doing vs. allowing. Previous work has demonstrated 
that, when an agent performs a morally bad action, people judge that the actor did something rather 
than merely allowed it to happen (Barry, Lindauer & Øverland, in press; Cushman, Knobe & Sinnott-
Armstrong, 2008). For example, participants were asked to read a vignette about a homeless man 
who was brought into the hospital because his organ systems were shutting down. He was attached 
to a ventilator, and would only live for a week or two, regardless of what his doctor did. In the 
morally neutral condition, the doctor disconnected the man from the ventilator because he wanted 
to save his dignity. In the morally bad condition, the doctor disconnected the man because he did 
not want to waste his time and resources on a homeless man. In both cases, the homeless man died 
as a result of the ventilator being disconnected. Participants are much more likely to say that the 
doctor ended the man’s life (vs. allowed it to end) when they read about the morally bad doctor.  
 Previous theoretical research has suggested that the distinction between doing and allowing 
can be spelled out in terms of alternative possibilities (though substantial disagreement remains 
about how to work out such an account in detail, Bennett 1993; 1995; Kagan, 1989). This emphasis 
on the role of possibilities in the theoretical research suggests that one promising approach to 
explaining the impact of morality on judgments doing/allowing may be to consider how morality 
impacts the relevance of alternative possibilities in such scenarios.  
Study 3a: Mediation 
Method 
Participants. Three hundred and ninety-nine participants (157 women, 2 unreported, mean 
age=31.62, SD=10.50) were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
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Procedure. Participants were asked to imagine the following scenario (Cushman, et al., 
2008): 
Dr. Bennett is an emergency-room physician. An unconscious homeless man is 
brought in, and his identity is unknown. His organ systems have shut down and a nurse 
has hooked him up to a respirator. Without the respirator he would die. With the 
respirator and some attention from Dr. Bennett he would live for a week or two, but 
he would never regain consciousness and could not live longer than two weeks. 
 
Participants assigned to the morally neutral condition then read: 
Dr. Bennett thinks to himself, “This poor man deserves to die with dignity. He 
shouldn’t spend his last days hooked up to such a horrible machine. The best thing to 
do would be to disconnect him from the machine.”   
Whereas participants assigned to the morally bad condition read: 
Dr. Bennett thinks to himself, “This bum deserves to die.  He shouldn't sit here 
soaking up my valuable time and resources. The best thing to do would be to 
disconnect him from the machine.” 
 
Then, participants read that Dr. Bennett proceeded to disconnect the man from the 
machine, and the man quickly dies. Next, similar to the first two studies, participants were asked to 
imagine two people (Sam and Alex) discussing how things could have gone differently.  Sam raises 
the alternative possibility in which Dr. Bennett did not decide to disconnect the man from the 
machine, and Alex objects, indicating that this possibility is not a relevant one. Participants were 
asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with Alex on a scale from 1 (“completely disagree”) to 
7 (“completely agree”).  As before, this measure was reverse coded to indicate a judgment of 
relevance, rather than irrelevance. Next, they were asked whether they thought that Dr. Bennett 
caused the man’s life to end, or allowed it to end, on a scale from 1 (“allowed to end”) to 7 
(“ended”). Lastly, demographic information was assessed. 
Results  
         Replicating previous results, participants in the morally bad condition were more likely to say 
that Dr. Bennett ended the man’s life (vs. allowed it to end; M=4.54, SD=2.29) compared to those 
in the morally neutral condition (M=3.01, SD=2.02), t(397)=7.05, p<.001, d=0.71. Next, we tested 
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whether participants rated the possibility that the doctor could have not disconnected the man as 
more relevant in the morally bad (vs. morally neutral) condition. Indeed, as predicted, we found that 
participants were more likely to judge the alternative possibility as relevant in the morally bad 
condition (M=5.30, SD=1.83) than the morally neutral condition (M=4.58, SD=1.95), t(397)=3.79, 
p<.001, d=.38, suggesting a connection between morality and the relevance of alternative 
possibilities in a third domain.  
  We then tested whether these judgments of relevance mediated the relationship between 
morality condition and judgments of doing/allowing (See Fig. 4). Using bootstrap mediation (5,000 




Figure 3. Mediation model with judgments of the relevance of alternative possibilities mediating the 
effect of morality on judgments of doing vs. allowing. Unstandarized coefficients and standard 
errors (in parentheses) are shown for each path. Asterisks indicate significance, ***p<.001. 
We also tested the ‘reverse’ mediation model and again found that it was also supported by 
the data 95% CIs [-0.49, -0.16]. Accordingly, we now turn to a direct manipulation of the proposed 
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mediator.  
Study 3b: Manipulation 
Similar to the previous studies, we test whether manipulating the relevance of alternative possibilities 
has the same effect as morality on participants’ judgments. Specifically, we ask whether non-morally 
increasing the relevance of alternative actions the agent could have taken leads participants to view 
the agent as more having done something rather than allowing it to happen. 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred thirty-nine participants (86 women, mean age=30.92, 
SD=10.30) completed a questionnaire using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Procedure. All participants received the vignette from Study 3a about the doctor who 
unplugs the ventilator in order to preserve the patient’s dignity. Participants were assigned either to a 
control condition or a ‘relevant alternatives’ condition. Participants in the control condition were 
simply asked to summarize and describe the events in the vignette. Those in the relevant alternatives 
condition were asked to think about what other decisions the doctor could have made, other than 
deciding to unplug the machine.   
Participants were then asked whether they thought that Dr. Bennett caused the man’s life to 
end, or allowed it to end, on a scale from 1 (“allowed to end”) to 7 (“ended”). 
Results 
Mirroring the effect of morality in Study 3a, participants in the relevant alternatives 
condition (M=3.46, SD=2.18) had higher ratings of ending the homeless man’s life (vs. allowing it to 
end), as compared to those in the control condition (M=2.90, SD=1.96), t(237)=-2.09, p=.038, 
d=.27. 
Study 3a-b Discussion 
As in the domains of freedom and causation, we found the impact of morality on judgments 
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of doing vs. allowing were mediated by changes in participants’ judgments about the relevance of 
alternative possibilities. Moreover, Study 3b demonstrated that when participants were asked to 
consider alternatives to the agent’s action, they judged the actor to more have done something rather 
than allowed it to happen, as was the case when morality was manipulated in Study 3a. 
 
Study 4: Intentional Action 
 We now turn to the effect of moral judgment on intuitions about intentional action. In 
previous work (Knobe, 2003), participants were asked to read a vignette about the vice president of 
a company who went to the chairman of the board and proposed a new program that would 
increase profits, but would also have a side effect. The side-effect was either morally good (helping 
the environment) or morally bad (harming the environment). In both cases, the chairman said he 
didn’t care about the side-effect – his sole aim is to increase profits. Participants were much more 
likely to say that the chairman brought about the side-effect intentionally when it was morally bad 
than when it was morally good. 
 Existing theoretical work has proposed that this effect, too, can be explained in terms of 
alternative possibilities (Cova & Egré, in press; Nduibuisi & Byrne, 2013). The key idea is that the 
agent’s actual attitude is exactly the same in both conditions (not caring at all) but this attitude is 
construed very differently depending on which alternative possibility people consider. In the 
condition where the agent helps the environment, people tend to consider possibilities in which the 
agent specifically wants to help the environment. Compared to these alternative possibilities, the 
actual agent seems to show a surprising lack of interest in helping the environment, and his behavior 
is therefore regarded as unintentional. By contrast, in the condition where the agent harms the 
environment, people tend to consider possibilities in which the agent specifically wants to avoid 
harming the environment. Compared to these alternative possibilities, the actual agent seems to be 
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surprisingly willing to harm the environment, and his behavior is therefore regarded as intentional.  
 In line with this, we test the prediction that when the side-effect is bad, participants will tend 
to regard as relevant possibilities in which the chairman wanted to avoid the side effect, and that 
these judgments of relevance explain the impact of morality on intuitions about intentional action. 
Study 4a Mediation 
Method 
Participants. Four hundred and one participants (147 women, mean age = 31.93 
SD=10.30) were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to read the following scenario (from Knobe, 2003): 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, “We 
are thinking of starting a new program.  It will help us increase profits, and it will 
also harm [help] the environment." 
  
The chairman of the board answered, “I don’t care at all about harming [helping] the 
environment.  I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new 
program.” 
  
They started the new program.  Sure enough, the environment was harmed [helped].  
 
As in the first three studies, participants were asked to imagine two people (Sam and Alex) 
discussing what happened.  
Alex: "I wonder how things could have gone differently." 
Sam: "Well, the chairman could have wanted to avoid harming the environment [helping the 
environment]." 
Alex: "Really? Of all the ways things could have gone differently, that doesn't seem like the 
one that's relevant to consider." 
 
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they agreed with Alex’s judgment that the 
possibility Sam raised was irrelevant on a scale from 1 (“completely disagree”) to 7 (“completely 
agree”).  As in all of the preceding studies, this measure was reverse coded. Next, they were asked 
whether they agree with the statement that the chairman of the board intentionally harmed the 
environment/shifted the consumer base on a scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly 
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agree”). Lastly, demographic information was assessed. 
Results 
         Participants rated the chairman’s actions as more intentional when the side effect was 
harming the environment (M=6.00, SD=1.29), compared to helping the environment (M=1.87, 
SD=1.28), t(399) = 32.10, p<.001, d = 3.21. Next, we tested whether participants differentially 
viewed as relevant the possibility that the chairman could have wanted to avoid the side-effect, 
depending on condition.  As predicted, we found that participants were more likely to judge this 
alternative possibility as relevant when the environment was harmed (M=5.54, SD=1.73), compared 
to when it was helped (M=3.41, SD=1.80), t(399)=12.10, p<.001, d=1.21. We then tested whether 
these judgments of relevance mediated the relationship between morality and judgments of 
intentional action (See Fig. 5). Using a bootstrap mediation (5,000 resamples), we found a significant 
indirect effect through judgments of relevance (95% CIs [-0.48, -0.12]).  
 
 
Figure 5. Mediation model with judgments of the relevance of alternative possibilities mediating the 
effect of morality on judgments of intentional action. Unstandarized coefficients and standard errors 
(in parentheses) are shown for each path. Asterisks indicate significance, ***p<.001. 
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We also tested the ‘reverse’ mediation model and again found that it was also supported by 
the data 95% CIs [-1.58, -0.49]. Accordingly, we now turn to a direct manipulation of the proposed 
mediator.  
Study 4b: Manipulation 
Unlike the three other domains, the original research on intentional action did not involve a 
morally neutral condition, but compared a case in which the side effect was morally bad (harming 
the environment) to one that is morally good (helping the environment). For consistency with the 
previous studies, we employ a case in which the side-effect was morally neutral (shifting the 
consumer base to be slightly older). Drawing on existing theoretical explanations of this effect, we 
then asked half of the participants to reflect on an alternative possibility in which the chairman was 
in favor of this neutral side-effect (paralleling the original ‘help’ vignette), and asked the other half of 
participants to reflect on an alternative possibility in which the chairman was against shifting the 
consumer base (paralleling the original ‘harm’ vignette). As in the previous studies, we test whether 
manipulating the relevance of alternative possibilities has the same effect as morality on participants’ 
judgments. Specifically, we ask whether non-morally increasing the relevance of the alternative 
possibility in which the chairman was against shifting the consumer base leads participants to view 
the chair as having acted more intentionally. 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred twenty-eight participants (71 women, mean age=31.46, 
SD=10.02) completed a questionnaire using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Procedure. All participants received a ‘neutral’ case in which the chairman implements a 
program that will have the side effect of shifting the consumer base to be slightly older. Next, we 
manipulated which alternatives possibilities were relevant. In one condition, participants were asked 
to imagine possibilities in which the chairman had wanted to avoid shifting the consumer base, while in 
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the other condition, participants were asked to imagine possibilities in which the chairman had 
specifically wanted to shift the consumer base.  
Participants were then asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the claim that the 
chairman intentionally shifted the consumer base. Participants rated this statement on a scale from 1 
(‘completely disagree’) to 7 (‘completely agree’). 
Results 
Mirroring the effect of morality in Study 4a, participants who were asked to imagine 
possibilities in which the chairman had wanted to avoid the side-effect gave higher intentional action 
ratings (M=3.47, SD=2.14) than did those who imagined possibilities in which he had wanted to 
bring about the side-effect (M=2.83, SD=1.80), t(225.95)=-2.47, p=.014, d=.32, corrected for 
unequal variance. 
Study 4a-b Discussion 
In Study 4a we found that the impact of morality on judgments of intentional action were 
mediated by changes in participants’ judgments of the relevance of alternative possibilities. In 
addition, Study 4b demonstrated that when participants were asked to consider an alternative 
possibility in which the agent wanted to avoid the side-effect, they judged that he acted more 
intentionally, mirroring the original effect of morality. 
 
Study 5:  
 On the hypothesis we have been exploring, the central factor that affects judgments across 
these domains is not just whether an alternative possibility is considered, but whether that possibility 
is regarded as relevant. Thus, our account predicts that even when people are instructed to explicitly 
consider a particular possibility, they will have different judgments depending on whether or not 
they regard that possibility as relevant.  
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 As demonstrated in Studies 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a, participants tend to regard alternative 
possibilities that are morally bad as less relevant than those that are morally good. As a consequence, 
our account predicts that even if all participants are instructed to consider some alternative 
possibility, it should matter whether that possibility is morally good (and thus more relevant) or 
morally bad (and thus less relevant). We test this prediction in a final study.  
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and fifty participants (114 women, mean age=34.29, SD=10.88) 
completed a questionnaire using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Procedure. All participants read about a busy and distracted student athlete who failed a 
professor’s chemistry class during a semester when the professor did not devote a great deal of time 
to teaching: 
Martin was a star football player in college who needed to complete a science class in 
order to continue to be eligible to play. He decided to enroll in Professor Smith’s 
chemistry class.  
 
During that semester, Professor Smith gave the same lectures he’d been giving for ten 
years, and held a single review session before the final exam. Martin was sometimes 
tired in class and was distracted from the material and he was often busy after class 
and didn’t have the time or energy to study on his own.  
 
By the end of the semester, Martin had earned a 48 on the midterm exam, a 65 in 
participation and a 55 on the final exam. At the end of the semester, Martin learned 
that he had failed the class. The athletics department was upset because Martin would 
not be eligible to play next year. 
 
In the Relevant Possibility condition, participants were asked to consider and describe what would 
have happened if Professor Smith had instead decided to spend more time making his lectures easier 
to understand and held additional office hours for students who weren’t understanding the material.  
In the Irrelevant Possibility condition, participants were asked to consider and describe what would 
have happened if Professor Smith had instead decided to alter Martin’s grades at the end of the 
semester so that Martin (but no other student) received an extra 30 points on each of the 
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assignments. 
After writing about what would have happened if these alternative possibilities had occurred, 
all participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement that Martin’s failing 
of the chemistry class was caused in part by Professor Smith. Participants rated this statement on a 
scale from 1 (‘completely disagree’) to 7 (‘completely agree’). Lastly, demographic information was 
assessed. All stimuli, data, and analyses for this and all previous studies are available at: 
https://github.com/phillipsjs/RoA 
Results 
Participants wh o considered the morally good (and thus more relevant) alternative possibility 
were more likely to agree that Martin’s failing was caused in part by Professor Smith (M=2.36, 
SD=1.39) than participants who considered a morally bad (and thus less relevant) alternative 
possibility (M=1.50, SD=0.84), t(188.00)=-5.85, p<.001, d=.76, corrected for unequal variance.  
To ensure that this predicted difference did not arise simply because participants believed 
the relevant alternative action was actually more likely to lead to Martin passing the class, we also 
coded participants’ written descriptions of what would have happened if Professor had acted 
differently (the full set of participants’ responses can be found at 
https://github.com/phillipsjs/RoA). A comparison of participants’ descriptions of what would have 
happened in these alternative possibilities revealed that participants directly mentioned that Martin 
would have passed the class more often when considering the irrelevant possibility (102 out of 132), 
than when considering the relevant possibility (69 out of 118), Χ2(1) = 9.33, p = 0.002, V = 0.193. 
Moreover, even when we look only at responses from participants who explicitly mentioned Martin 
passing the class, we reconfirm the finding that Professor Smith is held to be more causal when 
participants considered a relevant alternative action (M=2.87, SD=1.49) rather than an irrelevant one 
(M=1.47, SD=0.85), t(98.05)=-7.04, p<.001, d=1.21, corrected for unequal variance. 
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Discussion 
As confirmed by their written descriptions, participants in both conditions explicitly 
considered alternative possibilities that would have prevented the outcome from occurring. 
However, we observed the usual effect on participants’ causal judgments when the alternative 
possibility they considered was a relevant one. Accordingly, the effect we observed between the two 
conditions appears to be due not merely to whether participants considered some alternative 
possibility, but instead to whether they regarded that possibility as relevant.  
 
General Discussion 
In the past decade, research has begun to uncover the surprising ways that people’s moral 
judgments shape their non-moral cognition across a diverse array of domains (Cushman, Knobe & 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008; Knobe, 2003; Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Phillips & Young, 2011). While 
previous work has sought to account for the individual effect of morality in each domain (Machery, 
2008; Menzies, 2010; Nichols & Ulatowski, 2007; Sytsma, Livengood, & Rose, 2012), the present 
studies sought to offer a general framework that explains the effects observed across all of these 
domains. Specifically, we propose that morality’s influence in these diverse domains arises because 
morality directly affects whether people hold the alternatives to the agent’s action to be relevant. 
Though such alternative possibilities were previously posited to play a role in these domains in 
theoretical work (Lewis, 1979; Bennett, 1995; Knobe, 2010; Aristotle, 350 BC/2002), the current 
work is the first empirical demonstration that morality’s impact in all of these domains can be 
explained, at least in part, by changes in the relevance of alternative possibilities. 
Using the materials that originally explored the effect of morality in the domains of freedom, 
causation, doing/allowing, and intentional action, Studies 1a, 2a, 3a, and 4a provided support for the 
idea that morally bad (vs. morally neutral) actions lead to different judgments about the relevance of 
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alternative possibilities and that these judgments of relevance partially mediated morality’s effect on 
judgments across these domains. Studies 1b, 2b, 3b, and 4b offered more direct support for the 
relationship between the relevance of alternatives and judgments in each domain. Independent of 
morality, the relevance of alternative possibilities to the agent’s actions showed the same pattern of 
influence that morality has been shown to have: participants judged that the actor was less forced, 
more of a cause, more did something rather than allowed it to happen, and acted more intentionally 
when certain alternatives were perceived as relevant. Finally, Study 5 provided evidence that the 
effect observed in these judgments is due to the perceived relevance of alternative possibilities rather 
than the mere consideration of them.  
 
The role of the relevance of alternative possibilities 
As we noted in the introduction, theoretical research in a number of fields (philosophy, 
linguistics, computer science, etc.) has converged on the central importance of providing a role for 
the representation of alternative possibilities. Moreover, recent work in these fields has emphasized 
the need to sort or rank alternative possibilities in terms of their relevance (Kratzer, 2012; Halpern & 
Hitchcock, 2014; Bello, in press). Here, we provide the first empirical evidence that this theoretical 
suggestion can help explain the impact of moral judgments across a number of various non-moral 
domains.  
At the core of our account is a claim about the impact of moral judgments on intuitions 
about the relevance of alternative possibilities. More specifically, we argued that people show a 
general tendency to regard alternative possibilities as more relevant to the extent that they involve 
replacing morally bad things in the actual world with morally good alternatives. This tendency was 
observed in people’s intuitions about each of the separate vignettes (Studies 1-4), and we propose 
that it explains the effects observed in all four domains.   
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If this theory is correct, it may also shed like on the question of which moral judgment it is 
that affects judgments across these domains. Previous research had assumed that it was a moral 
judgment that was in some way concerned with what the agent actually did, and the controversy has 
been over precisely what sort of moral judgment it is (Alicke, 2008; Phelan & Sarkissian, 2008; 
Nadelhoffer, 2004). What the current research suggests is that another relevant moral judgment is 
one that is about alternative possibilities. This is made most clear in Study 5, where the actual thing 
the professor did was exactly the same in both conditions, and what changed was only the moral 
valence of the alternative possibility that participants considered.  
Though this general tendency can be found in all four domains, the precise details vary from 
one domain to the next. In each case, we find the same impact of moral judgment on the relevance 
of alternative possibilities, but these possibilities play importantly different roles in the different 
domains. Thus, to understand the role that alternative possibilities will play in a given domain, it is 
critical to consider existing theories of that specific domain. 
In the domain of freedom and force, for example, we turned to existing philosophical 
accounts according to which an agent only performed an action freely if he or she had the possibility 
of behaving otherwise (Carr, 1988; Yaffe, 2003). Based on these accounts, we suggested that 
people’s judgments about whether an agent freely performs some action depend in part on how they 
think about alternative possibilities in which the agent does not perform this action. The key claim 
here is that even in cases where it is obviously physically possible for the agent not to perform the 
action, a question arises as to whether not performing the action should be seen as a real possibility 
or as something so irrelevant that it should not be regarded as a genuine possibility at all. People’s 
moral judgments impact their intuitions about the relevance of these possibilities and thereby impact 
their judgments as to whether the agent acted freely.  
 By contrast, in the domain of intentional action, we turned to existing theories according to 
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which intentional action judgments are based in large part on perceptions of the agent’s attitude. We 
were therefore concerned with alternative possibilities concerning other attitudes that agent could 
have held. The key claim was that the agent’s actual attitude is the same in both conditions 
(complete indifference to the outcome) but that this attitude is construed differently depending on 
which alternative attitudes we take as a comparison. If we compare the agent’s actual attitude to 
possibilities in which he actively wants to bring about the outcome, the agent appears to be relatively 
uninterested in trying to bring it about. By contrast, if we compare it to possibilities in which he 
actively wants to avoid bringing about the outcome, the agent appears to be relatively interested in 
bringing it about. People’s moral judgments impact which of these two kinds of possibilities seems 
most relevant, and thereby impact their judgments as to whether the agent acted intentionally.  
 Within the domains of causation and the doing/allowing distinction, there is a bit more 
controversy, with many theories positing an important role for alternative possibilities but different 
theories describing this role in quite different terms (Bennett 1993; 1995; Lewis, 1973). For present 
purposes, the key point is just that a broad spectrum of different theories would converge on the 
same basic prediction. Specifically, to the extent that people focus on possibilities in which an event 
does not occur, they should be more inclined to regard that event as a cause and as an instance of 
doing rather than allowing (for discussion, see Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014; Knobe & Szabó, 2013; 
Schaffer & Blanchard, in press).  
 Further research could continue to explore these effects at multiple levels. At one level, we 
need to examine the very general ways in which moral judgments can impact the representation of 
alternative possibilities. On another, we need to look separately at each domain and try to work out 
the precise role that possibilities play within that domain.  
Situating the relevance of alternatives 
Previous research has shown that morality can affect when and how people engage in 
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explicit counterfactual reasoning. Specifically, this research found that when people are asked what 
would have prevented negative outcomes from occurring, they tended to consider counterfactual 
alternatives to morally bad (as opposed to morally good) actions (N’gbala & Branscombe 1995; 
McCloy & Byrne 2000). The present studies, by contrast, did not consider when participants 
engaged in counterfactual reasoning or which counterfactuals they consider. Instead, participants 
were presented with specific alternative possibilities and were then asked to assess the degree to 
which these possibilities were relevant. 
The present results thereby suggest that the impact of moral judgment is not just on which 
counterfactuals people consider in the first place. Rather, even when people are specifically 
instructed to consider a counterfactual, their moral judgments can impact their intuitions about 
whether the counterfactual is relevant or irrelevant. As demonstrated most clearly in Study 5, to the 
extent that a counterfactual is regarded as sufficiently irrelevant, people tend to feel that it does not 
truly represent a genuine possibility at all. It is this tendency, we argue, that lies at the root of the 
effects observed in all four domains. 
While the positive account offered here is ambitious in that it attempts to offer a unified 
explanation of a number of diverse phenomena, it is also quite modest in two important respects. 
First, while we explained morality’s impact on four different domains by demonstrating the role of 
the relevance of alternatives, we are not making the more general claim that all of morality’s 
influence on non-moral judgments can be explained in this way. In fact, we expect that there are 
many domains in which alternative possibilities are unlikely to play any role at all, and in such cases, 
the account offered here simply cannot be appealed to in explaining the impact of morality. To take 
just one example, Ames and Fiske (2013) recently demonstrated that the moral status of an action 
affects people’s assessments of the amount of monetary damage caused by that harm. Specifically, 
while participants in both conditions were told that the exact same amount of monetary expenses 
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were caused by the harm, participants in a condition in which the agent appeared to be more 
blameworthy later judged the total amount of damage (in dollars) to be greater. At present, we know 
of no research suggesting that alternative possibilities play a critical role in basic addition, and we 
find it highly unlikely that the current proposal will be able to be extended to effects of this nature. 
In addition to this first way that the scope of the current proposal is restricted, we also do not mean 
to suggest that morality’s influence in the four domains we examined (freedom, causation, 
doing/allowing, and intentional action) is solely explained by morality’s impact on the relevance of 
alternatives. After all, we only found that the relevance of alternatives partially mediated the effect of 
morality in these domains. Accordingly, it is likely that in each of these separate domains, there is 
some portion of the variance that is best accounted for by factors that are specific to that domain. 
Thus, we would argue that the current proposal is best understood as complementing previous 
research that may capture some domain-specific effects (for examples in the domain of intentional 
action, see, e.g., Sloman, Fernbach & Ewing, 2012; Sripada, 2010; Uttich & Lombrozo, 2010). 
 It is also likely that there are domain-general factors that affect these judgments. To take one 
example, research has suggested that individual differences such as gender or personality have an 
effect here (Feltz, 2007; Cokely & Feltz, 2009). Moreover, several theories have also proposed that 
morality may have a quite general influence on participants’ responses. For example, it has been 
suggested that people‘s moral judgments can impact their responses by affecting the conversational 
pragmatics (Adams & Steadman, 2004a; 2004b; Driver, 2008a; 2008b) or by triggering a motivation 
to justify the claim that the agent is blameworthy (Alicke, 2000; Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 
2009). This previous research has demonstrated a pervasive phenomenon whereby people’s 
understanding of the events that actually occurred is altered in ways that support and justify their 
desire to blame an agent. It is certainly possible that some portion of morality’s influence will be best 
explained by some of these pervasive phenomena. As Cushman (2014) has argued, it is often the 
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case that big effects are best explained by a combination of many separate smaller effects.  
Future work and conclusion 
 Across five studies, we found support for the idea that morality’s influence in the domains of 
freedom, causation, doing/allowing, and intentional action can be explained, at least in part, by 
changes in judgments of the perceived relevance of alternative possibilities. Studies 1a, 2a, 3a and 4a 
demonstrate that these judgments of relevance mediate morality’s influence in four domains. Studies 
1b, 2b, 3b and 4b more directly test the role of alternative possibilities in these four domains by 
demonstrating that non-moral changes in the relevance of alternative possibilities have a similar 
effect in each of these domains. 
The current proposal suggests a number of promising avenues for further research. First, 
future work should explore whether the present account can be extended to other domains in which 
morality has been shown to have an impact. Existing work has found an impact of morality not only 
in the four domains explored here but also on judgments of knowledge, happiness and innateness, 
among others (Beebe & Buckwalter, 2010; Phillips, Misenheimer & Knobe, 2011; Phillips, Nyholm 
& Liao, in press; Knobe & Samuels, 2013). Future work should examine judgments in these other 
domains, perhaps using the same methods employed here.  
Second, the present account suggests that judgments in the four domains explored here are 
influenced by morality because alternative possibilities play a central role in each of these domains. 
Thus, our account predicts that morality should also have an influence in any additional domains in 
which alternative possibilities play a central role. Future research could look to other domains in 
which possibilities play a role and ask whether an impact of morality can be found there as well. 
Third, Studies 1b, 2b, 3b and 4b showed that the relevance of alternative possibilities plays a 
role in these judgments even when the moral valence of an action is held constant. This suggests 
that other factors that influence judgments of the relevance of alternatives should also have an effect 
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in each of these domains. For example, existing theoretical work suggests that the relevance of 
alternative possibilities should not only be affected by moral judgments but also by judgments about 
frequencies (Halpern & Hitchcock, 2014; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Kratzer, 2012; Schaffer & 
Blanchard, in press). The present account therefore predicts that facts about frequencies should 
impact judgments in all four domains, and should do so in a way that parallels the present findings 
regarding the impact of morality. 
In short, the present work offers a unifying framework focused on the relevance of 
alternative possibilities that can help explain morality’s often puzzling influence on non-moral 
judgments, and opens up a number of exciting avenues for future research.  
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1 A direct replication of this study using a within-subjects design yielded in a similar pattern of 
responses.  Replicating previous results, participants rated Professor Smith as more of a cause 
(M=5.17, SD=1.63) than the administrative assistant (M=2.49, SD=1.62), t(399)=20.31, p<.001, 
d=1.65. Additionally, participants regarded the possibility in which the Professor did not take a pen 
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to be more relevant (M=4.86, SD=1.82) than the possibility in which the administrative assistant did 
not take a pen (M=2.91, SD=1.90), t(398)=10.47, p<.001, d=1.05 (reverse coded).  
